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Using institutional investors’ holdings data from Thomson Reuters’ 13F filings,
the first chapter studies and tests the market microstructure invariance hypothesis
proposed by Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016a), and in particular its implied −2/3 law
on the relationship between investors’ bets and stock trading activity, defined by
the product of price, volume, and volatility. With the identifying assumption that
institutional asset managers’ holdings are proportional to their bets, our empirical
results support the −2/3 law implied by the invariance hypothesis. The −2/3 law
is robust to a variety of estimation strategies and robustness checks. Then we
study whether distributions of bets are invariant and log-normal. Data strongly
support the hypothesis before March 1998, and the weak version of the invariance
hypothesis (the mean of distributions of bets is invariant) continues to hold in the
remaining periods. The strong version failing to hold after March 1998 may be due
to adjustment costs and very tiny positions.
The second chapter studies the role of convertible debt on investment. Con-
vertible debt in the capital structure facilitates investment for a firm (especially for
a firm with high leverage) since it reduces the firm’s interest payments and leverage
upon conversion, making it easier for the firm to issue new financial instruments.
However, the same property may bring an agency issue: The potential of conversion
into equity dilutes existing shareholders’ profits, decreasing the firm’s motivation to
do investment. We hypothesize that the agency issue brought by convertible debt
is minimal in very competitive markets since the external pressure is high, so that
the facilitation role may outweigh the dilution role, suggesting a positive effect on
investment, and that the agency issue brought by convertible debt may outweigh or
just offset the facilitation role in less competitive markets since the external pressure
is not high, suggesting a negative or insignificant effect on investment. Using data
from Compustat, we find that the convertible debt has a positive and quadratic
effect on investment rates in competitive industries (industries with very low HHI),
a negative and quadratic effect on investment rates in oligopoly industries (interme-
diate HHI), and an insignificant effect on investment rates in highly monopolistic
industries (high HHI). These effects are robust to including different control vari-
ables. We also suspect the interaction of warrants and competition has similar
effects. These results may have implications on the announcement effects or long
term effects of convertible debt issuance under different industry structures.
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Chapter 1: Market Microstructure Invariance: an Empirical Study
Using Holdings Data
1.1 Introduction
To study how traders’ behavior (e.g, trade size, the number of trades) varies
across different time periods and across different assets, Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016a)
propose two invariance hypotheses about trading and market microstructure. First,
the distribution of bet risk transferred per unit of business time, defined as the
product of share prices, the number of shares per bet, and the expected volatility
per unit of business time, is the same across different assets and across different time
periods. Second, the transaction cost function (price impact) of executing a bet is
the same across different assets and across different time periods when the bet size
is measured as the dollar risk transferred by a bet per unit of business time. These
hypotheses are a potent tool to build a bridge between unobservable microscopic
features such as bet sizes and rates and observable macroscopic features such as
trading dollar volume and volatility. The purpose of this paper is to empirically
study and test the first hypothesis using available public data: in particular, we use
Thomson Reuters’ 13F quarterly data from 1990 to 2015. There are two advantages
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of using these data: first, a majority of stock market participants are institutional
investors making bets every day; second, as institutional managers whose portfolio
value exceeds the 100 million dollar threshold are required to report to the SEC
about their holdings at the end of each quarter, their reported holdings are more
like independent ideas (bets, a core concept in the invariance hypothesis). We make
an identifying assumption that there is a constant linear relationship between an
investor’s holdings position and the size of a bet, focusing on studying the invariant
bet distribution and the invariance hypothesis’ prediction of a −2/3 law, which
means that the logarithm of bet size scaled by expected trading volume should have
a −2/3 linear relationship with the logarithm of asset trading activity, defined by the
product of price, volume, and volatility. A variety of specifications are implemented
to study and test the −2/3 law and the existence of an invariant distribution.
For the −2/3 law, we estimate the relationship quarter by quarter for 75 quar-
ters and find that the mean and the standard deviation of estimated coefficients
(or powers) are −0.657 and 0.032 respectively. Before and after the dot-com bubble
period, empirical results strongly support the −2/3 law. During the dot-com bubble
period, the estimated coefficient rides a rollercoaster: the estimated coefficient in-
creases from −0.628 in the 3rd quarter of 1998 to −0.548 in the 2nd quarter of 2000,
when the dot-com bubble rose to its peak, then falls from −0.548 to −0.657 in the
last quarter of 2003 when the stock market began to recover from the bust. After
controlling for lags of trading activity, we, however, find that the sum of coefficients
is close to −2/3, suggesting that investors’ holdings adjustments are relatively slug-
gish compared with the rocket speed of price changes. We then group observations
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by stock exchange, and find that estimated coefficients are all similar to −2/3. Fi-
nally, we estimate 108 quantile regressions, and find 92 estimated coefficients close
to −0.667 (absolute value of the difference between an estimated coefficient and
−0.667 is less than 0.1). There are 16 estimated coefficients not close to −0.667,
most of which are obtained during the bubble period. In sum, while the −2/3 law is
statistically rejected, our study results are qualitatively consistent and support the
−2/3 law implied by the invariance hypothesis.
For the bet distribution, pooling observations together, the common mean
and variance of bet size before March 1998 are 6.35 and 3.276 respectively. While
the variance across 23 quarters displays a slightly upward trend over time due to a
rise in the number of managers filling out 13F forms, almost all quarterly variances
are close to 3.276, implying that the bet distribution is invariant across different
time periods up to a second order. We divide observations before March 1998 into
7 regions based on expected volatility, with thresholds corresponding to the 1st,
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles. Estimated variances of the 7 regions
are 3.133, 3.24, 3.276, 3.349, 3.24, 3.168, and 3.24 respectively, indicating that the
variance is invariant across different stocks. While variances of the bet distribution
increase in the latter quarters (after 1998 Q1), the mean of the bet distribution is
stable across different stocks and different quarters, demonstrating that the weak
version of the invariance hypothesis continues to hold.
Gabaix et al. (2003, 2009) study shapes of aggregate stock behavior, and find
that stock returns and volumes adhere to certain power laws. Rather than focusing
only on stocks, the invariance hypothesis proposed by Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016a)
3
explores and emphasizes the relationship between investors’ trading strategy and
the volatility of stock and other asset returns. Since then, there has been a growing
literature testing this hypothesis. Assuming that an order size is proportional to
a bet, Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016a) study the invariance hypothesis using portfolio
transition orders from 2001 to 2005. Bae, Kyle, Lee, and Obizhaeva (2016) dis-
cuss this hypothesis using Korea Stock Exchange trading data from 2008 to 2010.
Their tests focus on a different implication (the relationship between the expected
bet rates and the expected trading activity) of the invariance hypothesis. Instead
of making an identifying assumption on bet size, they assume that the number of
switching points is proportional to bet rates. They find that the aggregate number
of switching points are related to the 0.675 power of trading activity, which is almost
equal to the 2/3 power predicted by the invariance hypothesis. Using Trades and
Quotes data from 1993 to 2008, Kyle, Obizhaeva, and Tuzun (2012) assume a TAQ
print is proportional to an intended order and hence proportional to a bet. In their
work, there are two subperiods: in the first subperiod, they show that the trade
arrival rates is related to the 0.69 power of expected trading activity; in the second
subperiod, they find that the arrival rate is related to the 0.787 (an average number)
power of expected trading activity and that the size of trade orders decreases, sug-
gesting that bets have been shredded into many small orders by investors after 2001.
Andersen, Bondarenko, Kyle, and Obizhaeva (2015) study the invariance hypothesis
by examing the number and the size of trades per minute using E-mini S&P 500
futures contracts from 2008 to 2011. They show the number of transactions within
one minute is related to the 0.671 power of expected trading activity.
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In contrast to existing research, we study investors’ holding behavior as op-
posed to trading behavior and use Thomson Reuters’ 13F quarterly holdings data,
which provides extremely abundant observations with fewer errors and noise. In
addition, we make the identifying assumption that holdings are proportional to bet
size. This assumption is not without grounds, as Kyle, Obizhaeva, and Wang (2015)
suggest that many traders have inventory targets when they trade. In this way, we
contribute to this literature by showing that the invariance hypothesis also holds
even when we assume the holdings position is part of bet size. Moreover, our study
shows that the −2/3 law is a good approximation to typical holdings size, which
provides the first benchmark for studying styles of certain investment managers (
Holdings size is abnormally large or small for a given stock).
In the following, we briefly review market microstructure invariance theory in
Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the data and summarize relevant statistics.
Various empirical specifications are implemented and reported in Section 4. We
perform robustness checks in Section 5. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 6.
1.2 A Brief Review of Kyle–Obizhaeva Theory
In this section, we review the first hypothesis of market microstructure invari-
ance proposed by Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016a) and show its implications. Read-
ers interested in more details and the second hypothesis may resort to Kyle and
Obizhaeva (2016a). For exposition, we use the same mathematical notation as in
Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016a).
5
A bet represents an independent trading idea, which can be implemented by
a single order or multiple orders. A buy order is a part of a buy bet while a sell
order is a part of a sell bet. We are able to observe order sizes and the number of
orders but cannot observe bet sizes or the number of bets since we do not know how
many orders form a single bet.1 When an investor sells a share (a part of a sell bet),
the share is bought by an intermediary (a market maker) who in turn will sell this
share to another intermediary or a buyer who is implementing a buy bet. Due to the
existence of intermediaries, the daily volumes we observe consist of volumes caused
by bet arrivals and volumes caused by intermediary trades. Since we don’t know
how many intermediaries will implement an order, we cannot observe bet volumes.
Likewise, the movement of daily volatility of returns can be induced either by the
impact of bets or news such as firm earnings reports or macro shocks, so we cannot
observe bet volatility (volatility induced by the impact of bets) either.
Denote the size (the number of shares bought or sold) of a bet by Q̃jt at time
t, where j represents a stock. The price of stock j at time t is denoted by Pjt. The
expected arrival rate of bets per calendar day at time t is denoted by γjt, so the
expected unit of business time at time t is 1/γjt. Assume the expected bet volatility
of stock j’s return per calendar day at time t is σ̄jt and hence the expected bet
volatility per unit of business time is σ̄jtγ
−1/2
jt . Then the dollar risk transferred by




1Kyle (1985) built a model in which investors intentionally hide and shred their target amount
into many small piece orders, trying to reduce transaction costs.
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There are 2 versions of the Kyle-Obizhaeva market microstructure invariance
hypothesis on the random variable Ĩjt: The strong version says that the distribution
of Ĩjt is constant across different assets and across different time periods while the
weak version suggests that the mean of Ĩjt is constant across different assets and
across different time periods2
Ĩjt
d











where Cont represents a constant. When one of P , Q, σ, or γ changes, the other
three variables will adjust accordingly in order to keep the risk invariant.
With certain identifying assumptions on relationships between bet volatility
and overall daily volatility and between bet volumes and overall daily volumes, either
hypothesis can be used to infer microscopic and unobservable trading variables such
as traders’ bet sizes and the number of bets from macroscopic and observable trading
variables such as daily dollar volume (the product of stock price and daily volume)







Note that a buy bet is positive while a sell bet is negative, but since both bets con-
tribute to bet volume, we use the absolute value of Q̃ to calculate bet volume. Using
2Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016b) verify their hypotheses in a dynamic model with adverse selection,
under the assumption that the cost of generating a bet and the distribution of a private signal are
the same across different assets and across different time periods.
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the expected bet volume and expected bet volatility, we are able to get expected
bet activity per calendar day as
W̄jt = PjtV̄jtσ̄jt, (1.5)
where expected bet activity is the expected aggregate risk transferred per calendar
day. Plug Ĩjt into W̄jt to get


























by C1 and calculate Q̃jt/V̄jt. The second implication can be














∝ −2/3 ln W̄jt. (1.9)
Stocks with increasing aggregate activity will attract more bets, as shown in equation
(1.7), and bets’ sizes will increase as well, resulting in higher volumes. As volumes
increase more than bets’ sizes, increasing aggregate activity leads to lower Q̃jt/V̄jt, as
implied by equation (1.9). Similarly, the same procedure yields another implication
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∝ −2/3 ln W̄jt. (1.11)
Bet volumes Vjt are not observable, and neither are expected bet volumes V̄jt. Sup-
pose each unit of order transfer from the seller to the buyer passes through ζjt
intermediaries (market makers). Then we have the following relationship between
observable daily volume V ojt and unobservale bet volume Vjt:




Here a sell order plus a buy order is counted once in calculating observed volume.
To make empirical tests simple, we follow Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016a) to assume
ζjt is constant across different assets and across different time periods. In the next
section, we shall discuss how to construct expected bet volume V̄jt from Vjt, which
in turn is obtained from V ojt through equation (1.12). We denote (ζjt + 1) /2 by C2.
Likewise, bet volatility σjt is not observable, and neither is expected bet volatil-




To facilitate our tests, ηjt is also assumed to be a constant and denoted by C3. The
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next section shall discuss how to construct expected bet-induced volatility σ̄jt from
σjt, which in turn is obtained from σ
o
jt through equation (1.13).
The market microstructure invariance hypothesis implies that the relationship
between the bet size scaled by expected volume and the expected trading activity
(equations (1.9) and (1.11)) should hold at any time. To test this hypothesis, we
choose time periods when we are able to get data. We now go to the next section
to discuss our data.
1.3 Data
We use WRDS’s (Wharton Research Data Services) CRSP (the Center for Re-
search of Stock Prices) database to get macroscopic variables such as price, volume,
and return for individual stocks over time.
In CRSP, there are 2 measures of stock return. The first measure takes into
account dividend distributions whereas the second excludes dividend distributions.
The values of these two measures of return are very similar. In the empirical analysis,
we use the first type of return.
We get institutional investors’ holdings data of individual stocks over time from
Thompson Reuters’ 13F filings. As required by the SEC, institutional investment
managers must report their holdings by filling out the 13F form at the end of each
quarter if their investment in securities exceeds 100 million dollars.
Our sample covers the period from March 1990 to December 2015. Only com-
mon stocks (share codes 10 or 11) listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (exchange
10
codes 1, 2 and 3 respectively) are studied. We employ the following variables from
CRSP: date, shrcd (security type), exchcd (exchange code), cusip, prc (closing
price), vol (daily volume), and ret (return). Cusip and date are combined to make
a unique variable used to merge with the 13F database. Observations with incom-
plete information or non-sensical items such as negative price or negative volume
are also dropped.
From the 13F database, the following variables are used: fdate (file date),
cusip, mgrno (manager number), and shares (share holdings at the end of a quar-
ter). The Cusip and fdate are combined to merge with the CRSP data file.
After merging, there are 29,729,196 matched observations representing the
holdings of a particular stock by a particular manager at the end of a particular
quarter. Since the 13F filings only have quarterly data and some of the CRSP
Cusip-date observations are dropped due to incomplete or wrong information, there
are 31,118,793 unmatched observations from CRSP and 28,235,642 unmatched ob-
servations from 13F.
1.3.1 Variable Construction
From CRSP, we get Pjt, daily trading volume V
o
jt, and daily returns. From
13F filings, we get institution manager i’s holding position Hijt on stock j at the
end of each quarter.
The expected bet volume V̄jt is calculated as the mean of the bet volume Vjt
of the previous 20 days. Due to missing data, the 20 days used may not be perfectly
11
continuous. With the previous assumptions on Vjt and V
o


























where r̄ is the mean of the return over the previous 20 days. With the previous













In the section on robustness checks, we shall construct these variables using data
from the past 60 days, which approximates the number of working days in a quarter.
1.3.2 Data Statistics
For the 26-year period, there are 75 quarters, 29,729,196 observations (i.e.
manager-stock holdings-quarter), 292,409 Cusip-quarter or firm-quarter observa-
tions, 14,546 Cusips, and 6,500 institutional managers. As shown in the third and
fourth columns of Table A.1 to Table A.3, there is an obvious upward trend over
time in the number of managers filling out 13F forms, and there is a clear spike in
the number of Cusips as we enter the boom period of the dot-com bubble.
The pertinent summary statistics are shown in Table 1.1. We get asset man-
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agers’ stock holdings from 13F filings. The maximum holding of a single stock is
752,500,000 shares whereas the minimum is 1 share (e.g., Berkshire Hathaway). Nat-
urally, the standard deviation of the number of stock holdings is substantial. The
25th percentile of stock holdings is 10,891 shares, implying that holdings greater
than 10,000 shares are economically important. The key variable in our empirical
study is holdings position scaled by expected volume, H/V̄ . While the mean of this
ratio is 1.49, most asset managers’ holdings are smaller than the expected volume
as the 75th percentile is just 0.454, and only 10 percent of observations have values
higher than 2.24. Hence, the distribution of H/V̄ is positively skewed with a long
but thin right tail.
We get stock prices from CRSP. Without deflating, the mean, maximum and
minimum of stock prices are $154.33, $226,000 (Berkshire Hathaway) and $0.016
respectively. The 90th percentile of stock price is $77.04, making stocks with prices
below $77 economically important. While a very small number of stocks have very
high prices, most stocks’ prices are below $100. That is, the distribution of P is also
positively skewed with a long but thin right tail. Excluding the outlier Berkshire
Hathway, the standard deviation of stock price is $52.32, which is not so large.
Among all matched stocks, the daily dollar volume (the product of price and daily
volume) of half of observations is higher than $22 million. The mean of expected
dollar volume in our matched sample is $120 million. The minimum is $100 while
the maximum is $11,900 million.
We calculate the ratio of expected volume to outstanding shares. Since the
expected volume and outstanding shares are measured in units of shares per day
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and units of shares respectively, their ratio is measured in units per day. Thereby,
whether stocks are active or not can be determined in terms of this ratio. The
maximum is 4.8 per day whereas the minimum approximates 0 per day, which means
that some stocks are very active and their business time can be expected to be very
short, while some stocks are inactive and their business time can be expected to be
large. The ratios are 0.000568, 0.001911, 0.003416, 0.006049, 0.010506, and 0.017348
at the 1st, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles respectively, indicating that,
for a majority of stocks, daily trading volume is only a small part of outstanding
shares.
As discussed in Section 1.2, in addition to shocks, order imbalances can result
in high volatility or big changes in price. Moreover, the square of volatility can also
be measured in units per day. Hence, along with the ratio of expected volume to
outstanding shares, volatility is an equally important measure as to whether stocks
are active or not. The mean of expected daily return volatility is almost 0.02. The
minimum approximates 0 whereas the maximum is 1.558. The expected daily return
volatility per calendar day is 0.0054, 0.009, 0.0121, 0.0177, 0.027, and 0.04 at the 1st,
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles respectively. The standard deviation of
the expected daily return volatility is 0.0176.
14
In some specifications, we group matched stock observations by stock ex-
change. Berkshire Hathaway had the highest stock price on the New York Stock
Exchange on December 31, 2014. Comparing stock prices at thresholds such as the
1st, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles, most observations on NYSE have
higher prices than on AMEX and NASDAQ. Comparing the ratio of expected vol-
ume to outstanding shares, stocks on NASDAQ are more active than NYSE, which,
in turn, are more active than AMEX. The implications for expected volatility on
the three stock exchanges are ambiguous. Since stocks on NASDAQ are more active
than NYSE and AMEX and stock prices on NYSE are greater than NASDAQ and
AMEX, the dollar volumes of most observations on NYSE and NASDAQ are greater
than AMEX.
Having examined the distribution of investors’ individuals’ holdings, we now
study the aggregate holdings at the investor level. Pooling Cusip-quarter observa-
tions together, the distribution of each Cusip-quarter’s float (the ratio of the sum
of shares held by managers with 13F filings, divided by total outstanding shares
held by all investors in the market) is shown in Figure 1.1. Among 292,409 obser-
vations, there are 65 observations for which this fraction is higher than 2, due to
short sales. Excluding these 65 observations in the figure, this fraction is almost
uniformly distributed and has a mean of 0.45.
Employing variables such as expected volume relative to outstanding shares
and expected daily return volatility, we classify stocks into 7 regions, with the first
region consisting of inactive stocks and the last region being composed of active
stocks. Dividing 292, 409 observations into 7 regions using the 1st, 10th, 25th, 50th,
15
Variables Mean Max Min Std 1st 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
13F H (103) 455.832 752500 0.001 3400 0.075 2.5 10.891 42.474 190.046 710.063
H/V 1.49 17221 5.92× 10−9 17.77 0.00005 0.00186 0.01 0.073 0.454 2.24
CRSP P 154.329 226000 0.016 3973.23 1.75 8.875 17.875 32.25 52.2 77.37
PV (106) 120 11900 0.0001 330 0.0382 0.787 4.2 22 100 300
V /Shares (10−3) 8.596 4802.2 0.0073 10.382 0.568 1.911 3.416 6.049 10.506 17.348
σ 0.0223 1.558 0 0.0176 0.0054 0.009 0.0121 0.0177 0.027 0.04
NYSE P 224.69 226000 0.016 4993.73 3.5 13.74 23.75 38.18 57.99 82.94
PV (106) 120 4655 0.0001 240 0.188 2.4 9.4 37 130 340
V /Shares (10−3) 7.59 393.32 0.01 8.242 0.707 1.95 3.234 5.473 9.136 14.986
σ 0.0192 1.386 0.0004 0.0142 0.0052 0.0084 0.0111 0.0155 0.0228 0.0332
AMEX P 34.42 4197.95 0.02 177.066 0.2601 1.56 4.188 11.375 25.05 43.02
PV (106) 4.6 257 0.0001 190 0.0044 0.025 0.0791 0.394 1.9 7.1
V /Shares (10−3) 4.468 615.86 0.02 8.246 0.1956 0.5638 1.0699 2.286 5.068 9.873
σ 0.0318 1.262 0 0.0285 0.0039 0.0113 0.0161 0.0247 0.038 0.0586
NASDAQ P 33.09 1274.95 0.0156 52.977 1.219 5.73 11.85 22.75 38.77 62.22
PV (106) 110 11900 0.0003 460 0.0226 0.2958 1.4 7.4 43 200
V /Shares (10−3) 10.609 4802.24 0.0073 13.226 0.528 2.042 4.222 7.693 13.142 21.551
σ 0.0276 1.558 0 0.021 0.0061 0.0109 0.0151 0.0224 0.0338 0.049
Notes: This table reports the statistics for our matched 29,729,196 observations. The variable H is the holdings position at the end of a particular date (the
end of each quarter) and is measured in units of shares. The variable H/V̄ is the ratio of holdings position at the end of a date to the expected daily volume
and is measured in units of per day. Variables V̄ and σ̄ are constructed as shown in Section 1.3.1. They are measured in units of shares per day and in units
of per square root of a day. The variable P V̄ is measured in units of dollar shares per day. The panel 13F reports the distributions of variables related to
asset managers’ holdings. The panel CRSP reports the distributions of variables related to stocks. The panel NYSE has 18,808,120 observations and reports
the distributions of variables related to NYSE-listed stocks. The panel AMEX has 497,315 observations and reports the distributions of variables related to
AMEX-listed stocks. The panel NASDAQ has 10,423,761 observations and reports the distributions of variables related to NASDAQ-listed stocks.
Table 1.1: Data Statistics for CRSP and 13F Database (1990–2015)
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75th, and 90th percentiles of expected volatility, the mean of float held by managers
filling out 13F forms are 0.471, 0.541, 0.576, 0.568, 0.511, 0.428, and 0.29. Other
than the fact that managers dislike stocks with extremely high volatility (daily
return volatility being greater than 0.04), there is no clear trend for their holdings
by volatility. Dividing 292,409 observations into 7 regions using the 1st, 10th 25th,
50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of expected volume over outstanding shares as
thresholds, the mean of float held by managers filling out 13F forms are 0.18, 0.272,
0.39, 0.50, 0.592, 0.65, and 0.645. This trend suggests that institutional investors
prefer holding stocks with high turnover, consistent with the finding of Gompers
and Metrick (2001) using a shorter sample.
The mean of aggregate float across different years is plotted in Figure 1.2.
While there are some small blips from 2007 to 2015, the mean of the total float held
by managers in the sample almost doubles between 1990 and 2007 as the number of
13F managers grows.
Finally, the distribution of the number of managers per firm-date, shown in
Figure 1.3, is right-skewed. Although the mean of this distribution is 102, more than
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Notes: Excluding 65 Cusip-date observations with Float Holding being greater than 2 and pooling
all other observations together, this figure describes the distribution of float held by asset managers
filling 13F. The variable Float Holding is calculated as the ratio of the sum of managers’ holdings
to outstanding shares.
Figure 1.1: The Distribution of Float Held by 13F Filings per Firm
1.4 Empirical Study
In our empirical analysis, we follow Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016a) to assume
that stock holdings have a constant linear relationship with bet size:
H̃i,j,t = C4Q̃i,j,t, (1.17)
where C4 is a constant and i represents managers, so Hi,j,t represents manager i’s
holdings of stock j at time t. We shall focus on testing the strong version of the
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Notes: This figure plots the mean of float held by asset managers across 26 years.
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Notes: This figure describes the distribution of the number of asset managers for each Cusip-date
observation. The 292, 409 Cusip-date observations are pooled together. The variable Manager of
each observation is calculated as the number of managers who hold the same stock (Cusip-date).












j,t Ĩ , (1.18)
where W̄
−2/3
j,t is defined in equation (1.5). To examine whether the −2/3 law on
the relationship between Hi,j,t/V̄j,t and W̄
−2/3
j,t holds visually, we plot ln(Hi,j,t/V̄
o
jt)
against ln(W̄ oj,t). We have 75 quarters in total. In the interests of space and size,
we only present 1 quarter in Figure 1.4. The other quarters are very similar. In the
figure, we superimpose a common fitted line with a slope −0.703 and an intercept
6.21 for the super cloud. As shown in Figure 1.4, the super cloud clearly indicate





that the shape of these super clouds (only one is presented here) approximates the
common fitted line. Finally, almost all scatter points are symmetrically distributed
around the fitted line, although the widths of the clouds are not exactly invariant
as we increase expected trading activity.
3Since the adjustment of holdings positions takes time, this assumption may be violated under
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j,t). The slope −0.703 and intercept 6.21 of the
fitted line are estimated using the whole sample.
Figure 1.4: The First Quarter of 1992
1.4.1 Log Linear Regression






= C − α ln(W̄ oj,t) + ǫi,j,t, (1.19)






j,t) instead of V̄jt
and ln(W̄j,t) in the regression, C is a function of C1, C2, C3, C4, and the mean of
ln Ĩ. Here ǫi,j,t is the difference between the random variable ln(Ĩ) and the mean of




1.4.1.1 Regression across Different Quarters
In this section, we estimate (1.19) using OLS quarter by quarter. Results
including the estimated coefficients, estimated constants and R2 of log linear regres-
sions are reported in Tables A.1–A.3 in the Appendix Section.
The estimated coefficients (or powers) over the 75 sample quarters are plotted
in Figure 1.5. Most estimates are close to the prediction of −2/3 of the invariance
hypothesis, except the period from September 1998 to September 2003. Statisti-
cally, the mean and standard deviation of the 75 estimated coefficients are −0.657
and 0.032 respectively while the maximum and minimum estimated coefficients are
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Year
Estimated Power Invariance Theory Prediction: −0.667
Notes: This figure plots 75 estimated powers reported in Tables A.1–A.3. We superimpose a red
line, of which the value is −0.667.
Figure 1.5: Estimated Powers for 75 Quarters, 1990–2015
During the period from September 1998 to September 2003, which corresponds
to the boom and bust of the dot-com bubble, the estimated coefficient steadily
increases to its peak in June 2000, after which the estimated coefficient gradually
decreases and goes back to −0.645 in September 2003.4 Sluggish adjustment caused
by transaction costs (price impact costs, see, for example, Kyle (1985)) may account
for the gap between the predictions of the invariance hypothesis and the estimated
coefficients during the dot-com period. To keep risk invariant (the distribution
of Ĩ), investors in a frictionless model may need to increase their holdings when
4This conclusion might be not very precise since we do not have data during the two subperiods:
September 2000–September 2001 and March 2002–June 2002. The data during the two subperiods
are either missing or discarded due to incomplete information
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the price decreases and decrease their holdings when the price increases. However,
this adjustment process incurs transaction costs, which may result in a relatively
sluggish adjustment during a period of extremely fast price changes such as the
bubble period, and hence the bet position (H̃i,j,t) is not able to restore Ĩ. With this






= C − αt−t0 ln(W̄
o
j,t)− ...− α0 ln(W̄
o
j,t0
) + ǫi,j,t, (1.20)
where t0 represents the first quarter of 1998. From the 4th quarter of 1998 through
the 1st quarter of 2003, the sums of coefficients for each quarter are as follows:
−0.64, −0.634, −0.612, −0.63, −0.609, −0.609 −0.59, −0.656, −0.688, −0.660, and
−0.661. While choosing the first quarter of 1998 as t0 is somewhat arbitrary, the
results from estimating (1.20) do suggest that adjustment costs may be important
to explaining substantial deviations from the invariance hypothesis.
Overall, the invariance hypothesis works well when the stock market is in stable
condition. During the bubble period, there is some discrepancy, and we suspect the
identifying assumption that the holdings position has a constant linear relationship
with the bet size is violated due to the sluggish adjustment process. The results
from estimating (1.20) are consistent with the above adjustment arguments.
1.4.1.2 Regression across Different Stock Markets
In this section, we pool all quarters together and estimate log-linear regres-
sion (1.19) across different exchange platforms (AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ).
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NYSE AMEX NASDAQ All
Number of Cusips 3,605 1,677 10,398 14,546
Number of Managers 6,354 4,392 6,348 6,500
Estimated Coefficient −0.733 −0.647 −0.673 −0.703
(0.0003) (0.0015) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Estimated Constant 6.60 5.57 5.86 6.21
(0.0035) (0.0139) (0.0037) (0.0024)
R2 0.2734 0.2830 0.3377 0.3173
#Obs 18,808,120 497,315 10,423,761 29,729,196
Notes: Using different exchange codes (the exchange codes of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ
are 1,2 and 3 respectively), we divide total matched observations into three subsamples. This
table reports the estimated results of three subsamples. Value included in the parentheses are
White-corrected standard errors
Table 1.2: Log Linear Regression Results across Different Stock Markets
Results are reported in Table 1.2. For the NASDAQ, we have 10,423,761 manager-
stock-quarter observations, 10,398 Cusips and 6,348 institutional managers. The
estimated coefficient is −0.673. For the AMEX, we have the least number of ob-
servations, 497,315, and the estimated coefficient is −0.647. For both exchanges,
estimated coefficients are almost equal to the predicted coefficient −0.667. For the
New York Stock Exchange, things are a bit complicated. We have the largest num-
ber of observations, 18,808,120, and there are 3,605 Cusips and 6,354 managers. The
estimated coefficient is −0.733, which is lower than the predicted result −0.667. In
the next section, we will study observations in New York Stock Exchange further.
Pooling all observations together, the estimated coefficient is −0.703.
1.4.1.3 The First Quarter of Each Year in NYSE
To further study the NYSE, we re-do the log linear regression across differ-
ent quarters. Here we present only some results in Table 1.3. They are close to the
theoretical prediction of −2/3 except during the bubble period and the Great Reces-
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sion. From 1992 to 1998, estimated coefficients are −0.655, −0.64, −0.677, −0.676,
−0.645, and −0.675; during the bubble period (1999–2003), estimated coefficients
are −0.603, −0.566, and −0.632;5 after the bubble period, estimated coefficients
are −0.667, −0.647, −0.644, −0.646, and −0.678 in years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008,
and 2009 respectively; during the recent period (2010–2014), the estimated coeffi-
cients are −0.728, −0.711 and −0.721, which are a bit lower than the prediction of
invariance hypothesis; the estimated coefficient goes back to −0.677 in 2015.
These estimated results across different quarters imply that the pooled NYSE
coefficient −0.733 may be affected by the period from 2010 to 2014, which needs to
be studied further. After dropping observations from 2009 to 2015, the estimated
pooled coefficient for the NYSE is −0.694.
5Recall we have some missing periods.
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Dates #Obs Cusips Managers Regression Coeff Constant R2
31mar1992 115, 690 1007 1111 −0.655 6.136 0.2477
(0.0033) (0.0366)
31mar1994 140, 047 1191 1210 −0.677 6.388 0.2634
(0.0030) (0.0346)
31mar1997 175, 348 1406 1432 −0.645 6.071 0.2904
(0.0024) (0.0285)
31mar1999 219, 946 1472 1722 −0.603 5.374 0.2353
(0.0023) (0.0298)
31mar2003 253, 031 1283 2043 −0.632 5.452 0.2286
(0.0023) (0.0308)
31mar2005 296, 526 1273 2363 −0.647 5.425 0.1716
(0.0026) (0.0346)
31mar2008 317, 407 1232 2972 −0.646 5.397 0.1701
(0.0025) (0.0369)
31mar2010 306, 199 1201 2913 −0.728 6.164 0.2121
(0.0025) (0.0343)
31mar2014 389, 759 1260 3516 −0.721 6.026 0.1597
(0.0026) (0.0361)
Notes: Only using NYSE observations, this table reports estimated results for the first quarter
of some years.
Table 1.3: Log Linear Regression Results for NYSE
1.4.2 Quantile Regression
In previous sections, we estimate coefficients using linear regression. The re-
sults are broadly in accordance with the prediction of the invariance hypothesis.
However, these estimation results only show how the mean of log holdings divided
by expected volume responds to the change of log expected trading activity. We
are not sure if managers with different holding positions have the same linear rela-
tionship with the log of expected trading activity. In this section, we use quantile
regression to study and test the invariance hypothesis. Our results are reported in
Tables 1.4 and A.4. Estimated coefficients in the first quarter of years 1992, 1994,
1997, 1999, 2003, and 2005 are plotted in Figure 1.6. For each quarter, we use
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quantile regression to estimate the linear relationships between the 1st, 10th, 25th,
50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of the log of holdings divided by expected volume
and the log of expected trading activity. As plotted in Figure 1.6, the estimated
coefficients in most subfigures fluctuate around the value of −2/3 predicted by the
invariance hypothesis. Among 108 estimated coefficients shown in Tables 1.4 and
A.4, there are only 16 coefficients having differences greater than 0.1 from −0.667.
All 16 of these coefficients are from quarters after March 1998, and most of them
come from the 1st or the 10th quantile regression, suggesting that the invariance
hypothesis applies to most holdings but not to very small positions.
1.4.3 Testing the −2/3 Law on the Full Sample
Pooling all observations together, we do the following estimation to formally






+ 2/3 ln(W̄ oj,t) = C + α0 ln(W̄
o
j,t) + ǫi,j,t, (1.21)
The null hypothesis that α0 is zero is statistically rejected. But this rejection may be
due to the very large size of our sample. We have millions of observations and hence
the standard error (0.0002) is very small, yielding a large t value and making α0
significant. The estimated coefficient is very small and equal to −0.036. In addition,
both the upper support and the lower support of the 95% confidence interval are
near zero, suggesting that α0 is economically close to zero.
In the next section, we directly study whether the distribution Ĩi,j,t is invariant.
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Specifically, we study the stronger hypothesis proposed by Kyle and Obizhaeva
(2016a) that the distribution Ĩi,j,t is not only invariant but also log-normal. Our
empirical results justify the strong version during periods from 1990 to the first
quarter in 1998. While the strong version fails to hold during period from the second
quarter in 1998 to 2015, the weak version that the mean is invariant continues to
hold.
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1st 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
31mar1992 −0.697 −0.723 −0.734 −0.690 −0.655 −0.603
(0.0075) (0.0039) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0034)
31mar1993 −0.677 −0.693 −0.727 −0.685 −0.656 −0.600
(0.0065) (0.0035) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0031)
31mar1994 −0.682 −0.676 −0.733 −0.717 −0.678 −0.611
(0.0065) (0.0035) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028)
31mar1995 −0.672 −0.687 −0.738 −0.708 −0.680 −0.616
(0.0065) (0.0032) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027)
31mar1997 −0.650 −0.683 −0.718 −0.689 −0.659 −0.591
(0.0051) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024)
31mar1998 −0.669 −0.730 −0.747 −0.701 −0.662 −0.593
(0.0049) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0025)
31mar1999 −0.504 −0.545 −0.666 −0.645 −0.618 −0.564
(0.0070) (0.0036) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0022)
31mar2000 −0.457 −0.478 −0.601 −0.603 −0.588 −0.541
(0.0064) (0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0021)
31mar2003 −0.543 −0.524 −0.642 −0.657 −0.648 −0.606
(0.0075) (0.0033) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0021)






= C − α ln(W̄ oj,t) + ǫi,j,t,
we estimate how the 1st, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of Hi,j,t/V̄
o
jt respond to the
change of ln(W̄ oj,t). Estimated coefficients and White-corrected standard errors are reported in
the first line and second line respectively. This table reports quantitle regression results from
March 1992 to March 2003. White-corrected standard errors are included in the parentheses.
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Notes: This figure plots 1st, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantitle regression results.
Figure 1.6: Quantile Regression in the First Quarter of Years 1992, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2003, and 2005
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1.4.4 The First Subsample: 1990 through 1998 Q1
In this section, we shall study the distribution of the following random variable








Pooling data, the common mean and variance are 6.39 and 3.292 respectively. Con-
sidering that we have many observations, the variance 3.292 is statistically similar
to the 2.58 obtained in Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016a). To check if the distribution of
I∗ is normal and invariant, two specifications are employed: first, we pool observa-
tions together and examine each quarter in each year, where the null hypothesis is
that moments of I∗ are the same across different quarters and in accordance with
the common mean 6.35 and variance 3.29; second, observations are divided into 7
regions in terms of expected volatility σ̄ or expected volume divided by outstanding
shares, with thresholds corresponding to the 1st percentile, 10th percentile, 25th
percentile, 50th percentile, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile as shown in Table
1. The null hypothesis is that moments of I∗ are the same across different regions
and in harmony with common moments.
1.4.4.1 I∗ across Different Periods
In this section, we compute moments of I∗ for the first quarter of each year.
The distributions for the six quarters are plotted in Figure 1.7. In each subplot,
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we superimpose the common normal distribution. There are only small differences
between the common mean and the mean of each quarter, as the quarterly means are
6.32, 6.32, 6.30, 6.23, 6.37, and 6.39 respectively. While there is an upward trend of
the standard deviation as the number of managers filling out the 13F form increases,
all standard deviations are still very close to the common standard deviation 1.81,
making the argument that distributions of I∗ are invariant across different quarters
convincing.6
1.4.4.2 I∗ across Stocks with Various Levels of Activity
As documented in section 1.3.2, two variables are used to quantify the level
of activity in particular stocks, σ̄ and V̄ /S, where S is outstanding shares. There
are two interesting findings in section 1.2 : investors dislike stocks with extremely
high daily volatility (daily volatility greater than or equal to 0.04); and investors
favor stocks with high turnover rates. It is interesting to study if the distributions
of I∗ are invariant across stocks with various levels of volatility or liquidity. In this
section, observations are divided into 7 regions in terms of these 2 variables with
thresholds corresponding to the 1st, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles
displayed in Table 1.1. All results are plotted in Figures 1.8 and 1.9 respectively.
Except for the mean of the first region, all moments are very close to an invariant
normal distribution with a mean 6.35, a standard deviation 1.81, a skewness 0, and
a kurtosis 3 in Figure 1.8. Results are similar in Figure 1.9, making the argument
6In this paper, we don’t present results from the 1980s, but they are almost the same as those
presented here.
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The First Quarter in 1998
Notes: This figure plots the distribution of I∗ defined as ln(Hi,j,t/V̄
o
jt) + 2/3 ln(W̄
o
j,t).
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Notes: This figure plots the distribution of I∗ for the 7 regions respectively.
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Notes: This figure plots the distribution of I∗ for the 7 regions respectively.
Figure 1.9: Distributions of Stocks with Different Expected Turnover Rate
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1.4.5 The Second Subsample: 1998 Q2 through 2015
The second subsample rejects the strong version of the invariance hypothesis
as the variance of I∗ increases over time. We proceed to study the weak version and
calculate the following value for each stock in each quarter. The null hypothesis







+ 2/3 ln W̄ ojt. (1.23)
Using the mean of managers’ holdings of stock j at time t, results for 23
quarters are shown in Tables A.5 and A.6. To reduce outliers, the 1st percentile
and the maximum are not reported. There are two obvious features: first, while
there are some small fluctuations, the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles
are almost invariant across different quarters; second, the value of (1.23) ranges
between 6 and 8 for more than 80% of stocks, and given there are thousands of
stocks in each quarter, this range is small.
In Section 1.3.2, we found that more than half of stocks are held by fewer than
50 managers, suggesting that the sample for each stock might be small. So we also




jt in each quarter. All of these values
are found to be close to 7.7.
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1.5 Robustness Checks
In this section, we re-examine our regression results by considering various
robustness checks.
1.5.1 Winsorize Variables
To reduce the impact of outliers, we winsorize variables such as holdings,
prices, expected volumes and expected volatility at 1%. We re-do regressions quar-
ter by quarter. The mean and standard deviation of these 75 newly estimated
coefficients or powers are −0.663 and 0.032 respectively. The maximum and min-
imum are −0.554 and −0.707 respectively. These newly estimated coefficients are
not presented but are very similar to Figure 1.3.
We also re-do the regressions for the different stock exchanges. The newly
estimated coefficients for NYSE, NASDAQ AND AMEX are −0.734, −0.652 and
−0.683 respectively.
1.5.2 Re-Construct V̄ and σ̄
In Section 1.4, we construct V̄ o and σ̄o using data from the previous 20 days.
In this section, we use data from the previous 60 days, which approximates the
number of working days in a quarter.
We calculate differences between the estimated powers in Section 1.4 and es-
timated powers in the current section. The maximum, the mean and the minimum
of the differences are 0.02, 0.003 and −0.029 respectively. The standard deviation
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of the differences is about 0.009. So the regressions in this section quantitatively
confirm our previous results. Moreover, as was the case in Figure 1.5, the newly
estimated coefficients are consistent with the prediction of the market microstruc-
ture invariance hypothesis except during the bubble period (1998–2003). The newly
estimated power rises to its peak (−0.539) in June 2000 on the exact day the previ-
ous estimated power rises to its peak (−0.548). Hence, the regression results in this
section also qualitatively confirm our previous results.
1.5.3 Falsification Test
In Section 1.4, the dependent variable is holdings scaled by expected volume,
and the econometric setting is implied by the invariance hypothesis. Our empir-
ical tests are consistent with the prediction (−2/3 law) of market microstructure
invariance. In this section, we test if the −2/3 law also applies to relationships not








ln(Pj,tSj,tσj,t) + ǫi,j,t, (1.24)
where Sj,t is the number of outstanding shares of stock j at time t. There are two
reasons why we use outstanding shares to substitute for expected volume on the right
side. For one thing, there is a strong correlation between volume and outstanding
shares. For another thing, the core definition of market microstructure invariance is
a bet. Using the bet rate γ̃ and bet size Q̃i,j,t, the market microstructure invariance
has implications for expected volume. But the invariance hypothesis doesn’t have
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any implication for outstanding shares. Using outstanding shares to substitute for
expected volume in the regression, we should expect that either the R2 becomes
smaller given the validity of the invariance hypothesis, or that the newly estimated
coefficients are further away from −2/3.
Again, we do this regression quarter by quarter. Our results are shown in
Figures 1.10–1.11. The result is visually ambiguous in Figure 1.10.7 However, Figure
1.11 shows that all R2 using outstanding shares (red points) are smaller than those
using expected volume, suggesting that the invariance hypothesis-implied predictor
has more explanatory power.
1.6 Conclusion
The market microstrucuture invariance hypothesis postulates that the distri-
bution of dollar risk transferred by a bet per unit of business time is the same across
different assets and across different time periods. This hypothesis implies that the
log of bet size scaled by expected volume has a constant linear relationship with the
log of expected trading activity, defined as the product of expected volatility and
expected dollar volume. With the identifying assumption that the holding position
has a constant linear relationship with the size of a bet, this paper studies and tests
this hypothesis. Using various specifications, empirical tests statistically reject but
are qualitatively largely consistent with the prediction of the invariance hypothesis.
7To be precise, 46 out of 75 newly estimated coefficients using outstanding shares are further
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Notes: This figure compare 75 estimated powers using outstanding shares (red points) and esti-
mated powers using expected volume (blue points). We superimpose a red line, of which the value
is −0.667.












1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Year
Use Expected Volume Use Outstanding Shares
Notes: This figure compare R2 of 75 tests using outstanding shares (red points) and tests using
expected volume (blue points).
Figure 1.11: Comparison of R2
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Chapter 2: On the Role of Convertible Debt on Investment
2.1 Introduction
According to Calamos (2018),1 the new issuance of convertible securities in
the United States increased by 61% in 2018. A simple calculation suggests that the
average issuance of convertible securities over the past 21 years was $51.2 billion per
year. As convertible securities become more important for firms, economists have
put significant effort into studying different roles of convertible bonds, one of the
most important convertible securities.
This paper studies how firms’ debt composition, and in particular the ratio
of convertible bond value to the total debt value, affects firms’ investment under
different industry structures. We formulate two empirical hypotheses concerning
the interaction effects of debt composition and competition on investment, build-
ing a bridge between the literature on the relation between convertible debt and
investment and the literature on the relation between competition and investment.
Many researchers have studied how competition or industry structure affects
firm investment: Spence (1977), Dixit (1980), and so on. Empirically, Akdogu and
Mackay (2008) and Jiang, Kim, Nofsinger and Zhu (2015) find that there is a positive
1See page 9 of Calamos (2018), who in turn references Merrill Lynch Global Research.
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relation between market competition and investment. Akdogu and Mackay (2008)
argue that the sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s Q is lower and investment speed is
slower in monopolistic industries than competitive industries. Due to firms’ strategic
incentives to deter entry or induce exit, they find that the investment-Q sensitivity
and investment speed are highest in oligopoly industries. In existing empirical work
on competition and investment, the only financial instrument hypothesized to affect
investment is total debt. We show that investment depends on the composition as
well as the level of debt.
While there is a significant literature studying how convertible debt affects firm
investment, which will be discussed in the next section, this work has not studied
the effect of convertible bonds on investment under different industry structures (as
measured by, say, the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index). We show that convertible debt
plays a different (positive or negative or insignificant) role across different industry
structures. Convertible debt has a positive and significant effect on investment
in very competitive industries, whereas convertible debt has either a negative and
significant or insignificant effect in less competitive industries.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first paper studying the inter-
action effect of convertible debt and industry structure or competitiveness on firms’
investment.2 Our empirical results can be summarized as follows: Pooling obser-
vations together, convertible debt doesn’t have a significant effect on investment.
When observations are divided into three regions using the HHI constructed from
2Korkeamaki and Moore (2004a) use the proceeds of convertible debt to study how firms’ own
characteristics affect their investment speed, but they do not study the effect of debt composition
and industry competitiveness.
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sales, the results are different in the three regions. Specifically, in the first region,
where HHI<0.1, which means the industries in this region are very competitive,
convertible debt has a positive, concave, and significant effect on investment, and
this effect is especially strong for firms with high leverage. In the second region,
where 0.1<HHI<0.18, which means the industries in this region are less competitive,
convertible debt has a negative, convex, and significant effect on investment. In the
third region, where HHI>0.3, which means the industries in this region are monop-
olistic, convertible debt has an insignificant effect on investment. Since warrants
are similar to convertible bonds, we suspect warrants would have similar interaction
effects on investment.
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Many researchers have studied convertible bonds from different perspectives.
In this section, we briefly review the literature on convertible bonds and develop our
hypotheses. For a detailed review on convertible bonds, see the work of Dutordoir,
Lewis, Seward, and Veld (2014).
Convertible debt, a hybrid instrument of equity and straight debt, provides
investors with a way of obtaining a relatively safe return on investment while offer-
ing an option to take advantage of upward movements of stock prices by converting
the straight debt into equity if the issuer performs well. Investors can voluntarily
convert their debt into equity. Most convertible bonds have a call provision, which
allows the issuer to force the investor to choose between being paid back the straight
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debt or converting into equity. If there is weak or no call protection, the issuer is
able to force conversion whenever they want. Embedding weak or no call protection
into convertible debt is costly to the issuer. Since it benefits the issuer, such bonds
are cheaper (Korkeamaki and Moore (2004b)). According to their study, weak call
protection was more popular before 1988 whereas hard call protection was more
popular after 1988. Asquith and Mullins (1991) find that firms’ mangers don’t want
to convert bonds into equities, instead they wait for investors convert voluntarily.
An important reason is that firms benefit from paying less in interest than in div-
idends. When adverse selection make equity issuance less attractive, the existence
of convertible debt can make the economy efficient (e.g., investment is efficient and
claims are priced fairly), as shown by Stein (1992).
Many researchers have studied how convertible debt solves agency conflicts
and hence affects firms’ investment. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Green (1984)
suggest that convertible bonds or warrants are able to reduce existing shareholders’
risk-shifting incentives. Dorion, Francois, Grass, and Jeanneret (2014) and Eisdorfer
(2008) empirically confirm that convertible debt reduces risk-shifting incentives,
especially for financially distressed firms. The intuition is as follows: when a firm
has high leverage, existing shareholders have incentives to invest in risky projects
or invest during periods when volatility is high. If things don’t go well, the loss
for existing shareholders is not big since their equity is an out-of-the money option
with little value. If things do go well, existing shareholders can benefit. However,
convertible debt holders can convert their debt into equity when things go well,
diluting existing shareholders’ profits and reducing their incentive to invest in risky
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projects. Maksimovic (1988) builds a collusive model, showing that warrants or
convertible debt can serve as a contingent tax on existing shareholders if they deviate
from a collusive strategy by producing more output. The conversion of warrants or
convertible debt into equity dilutes existing shareholders’ profit, deterring them
from deviating from the collusive strategy. This convertible-bond-dilution literature
shows that the potential for dilution ex post deters existing shareholders from doing
something ex ante.
Convertible bonds can also facilitate investment. Mayers (1998) argues that
convertible bonds in a firm’s capital structure facilitate the firm’s investment when
there is a profitable investment opportunity, since it can reduce interest payments
and the firm’s leverage upon call conversion, which is helpful for refinancing. Moti-
vated by Mayers’ work, Korkeamako and Moore (2004b) study how a firm’s invest-
ment speed affects the call provision embedded in convertible bonds. More recently,
Lyandres and Zhadanov (2014) build a model showing that convertible debt induces
firms to invest quickly and that an appropriate composition of convertible debt
and straight debt is able to completely solve the under-investment issue induced
by straight debt (i.e., the classical debt overhang problem, see Myers (1977)). We
simply refer to these works as the convertible-bond-facilitation literature.
It is possible that both facilitation role associated with relaxed financial con-
straints and the dilution role associated with agency issues interact simultaneously.
Although not explicitly assumed in the convertible-bond-dilution literature, the po-
tential of dilution ex post may deter existing shareholders from investing ex ante.
This paper tries to rationalize these two (and potentially opposing) roles in a sim-
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ple framework. We hypothesize that the agency issue associated with dilution is
less significant for firms which face significant external competitive pressure and is
more significant for firms which do not face significant external competitive pressure.
These hypotheses are similar to the conventional wisdom of political economy that
external war tends to generate common interests across groups in society whereas
internal civil war entails deep conflicting interests across groups (These words are
borrowed from Besley and Persson (2008)), and perhaps are more close to the view
of Giroud and Mueller (2011) that firms in competitive industries benefit less from
good governance than firms in less competitive industries. The theoretical rationale
behind the latter study is that CEOs or managers in competitive industries tend
to reduce slack and work hard, striving to reach a given target (Hart (1983)) or
prevent liquidation (Schmidt (1997)). Consequently, there is not much a role for
good governance.
Hypothesis 1: In very competitive industries where firms are facing pressure
to survive and have less market power, the issuers’ option to force conversion, which
turns debt into equity, alleviating firms’ debt pressure and reducing interest pay-
ments, has a positive effect on investment. Convertible debt encourages investment
more in competitive industries than in noncompetitive industries.
Hypothesis 2: In less competitive industries where firms don’t face competitive
pressure to survive and have more market power, the bondholders’ option of vol-
untary conversion, which turns debt into equity and dilutes existing shareholders’
profits, deters firms from investing, including strategically over-investing to deter
entry or induce opponents to exit. Convertible debt discourages investment more in
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noncompetitive industries than in competitive industries.
2.3 Data and Empirical Studies
This paper uses annual data provided by Compustat. Our sample covers the
period from January 1985 to December 2005. All observations which report the item
dcvt (long term convertible debt) are included. The HHI measure for each four-digit
industry is constructed from the item sales (net). The dependent variable is the
investment rate, which is defined as the item capx (capital expenditure) divided
by the item at (total assets). Our key independent variable is debt composition
or convertible debt share, which is defined as the item dcvt (long term convertible
debt) divided by total debt.3
Following the investment literature (e.g., Dessaint, Foucault, Fresard, and Ma-
tray (2018) and Akdogu and Mackay (2008, 2012), a number of control variables are
included. Firm size is the natural log of total asset value. The total debt level is
calculated as the sum of two items: dlc (debt in current liabilities) and dltt (long-
term debt). Market value is the product of csho (common shares outstanding) and
prcc c(price close-annual). Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the sum of total assets and
market value minus the item ceq (common equity) to total assets. Cash flow is
3Most research studying convertible debt’s effect on firm’ performance focuses on the comparison
of before and after convertible issuance. For changes in stock returns, see, for example, Lee
and Loughran (1998), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1998), Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2001). For
changes in firms’ operating performance, see, for example, Lee and Loughran (1998) and Lewis,
Rogalski and Seward (2001). For changes in risk, see, for instance, Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward
(2002). These works do not study the effect of firms’ debt composition (the ratio of convertible
debt to straight debt), which is a key component in the study of Maksimovic (1988) and Lyandres
and Zhadanov (2014). The only exception is Dorion, Francois, Grass, and Jeanneret (2014), who
use debt composition as a control variable to study the effect of risk shifting incentives on the
decision to issue convertible debt.
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the sum of the item ibc (income before extraordinary items) and the item dp (de-
preciation and amortization). Cash holdings is the item che (Cash and Short-Term
Investments). Debt level, cash flows, and cash holdings are all scaled by total assets.
Firms’ riskiness may affect their investment decisions ((Panousi and Papanikolaou
(2012)) and their decisions in issuing convertible debt (Dorion, Francois, Grass, and
Jeanneret (2014) and a series of works by Lewis). We use stock volatility, which is
measured as the standard deviation of the previous 12 monthly returns, as a proxy
for a firm’s riskiness. Finally, firms’ industry peers’ characteristics (investment,
debt composition, debt level, size, cash holdings, cash flows, and Q) are defined
analogously and also included in our study.4
2.3.1 Data Statistics
The sample has 377,422 observations over the period from 1985 to 2005. Firms
in the Finance (6000 ≤ sic ≤ 6999) and Utilities (4900 ≤ sic ≤ 4999) industries are
excluded due to their regulatory requirements. Observations with negative sales or
capital expenditure are excluded. The dependent variable is the investment rate
of the next year (capital expenditure in the next year scaled by the total assets of
the current year). Thus, we only keep firms with two consecutive years of data on
capital expenditure. This leaves us with 16,276 firms and 240,836 observations. By
merging with the item volatility, calculated using CRSP’s monthly stock returns,
90,274 observations are not matched and we are left with 150,562 observations. Ta-
4For each characteristic, we calculate the equally-weighted mean of a firm’s peers, defined as
other Compustat firms in the same four digit industry.
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ble 2.1 presents the relevant summary statistics.5 The HHI is 0.0634, 0.1050, 0.1782,
0.2883 and 0.4459 at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles respectively.
We divide HHI into three regions: we refer to industries with HHI<0.1 as very com-
petitive industries; we refer to industries located in the region with 0.1<HHI<0.18
as oligopoly industries; and we refer to industries located in the region HHI>0.18,
as monopolistic industries. These cutoffs are the same as in Akdogu and Mackay
(2008), who follow the standards of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission. For all three regions, the key variable debt composition is 0 at the
10th, 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles, respectively. Thus, summary statistics focus
on the mean, 90th percentile and standard deviation.
There are 3,992, 4,482 and 7,492 observations with zero overall debt in the
lower HHI region, the intermediate HHI region, and the large HHI region respec-
tively. We include these observations in our reported results. Including or excluding
these observations doesn’t affect our results.
For all three regions, the overall debt level, defined as the ratio of overall debt
to total assets, is zero at the 10th percentile. But there are differences in the mean
debt levels across the three regions. The mean in the low HHI region is higher than
the mean in the intermediate HHI region, which in turn is higher than the mean
in the higher HHI region. These means are 0.245, 0.230, and 0.225 respectively.
Another notable feature is that the debt level has a much larger standard deviation
in the lower HHI region.
The mean of the convertible debt share, defined as the ratio of convertible
5These variables frequently appear in previous literature on investment.
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debt to overall debt, is a bit lower in the low HHI region than in the intermediate
HHI region but higher than in the large HHI region.
In the low HHI region, Tobin’s Q is 0.916, 1.133, 1.568, 2.545, 4.333 at the
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles respectively. In the intermediate HHI
region, Tobin’s Q is 0.900, 1.117, 1.529, 2.409, and 4.117 at the 10th, 25th, 50th,
75th, and 90th percentiles respectively, while in the large HHI region it is 0.872,
1.072, 1.435, 2.177, and 3.624 at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles
respectively, suggesting that the competitive industries have more growth opportu-
nities than industries in the other two regions. Their means are 2.426, 2.274, and
2.096, respectively.
The investment rate, defined as next year’s capital expenditure scaled by this
year’s total assets, suggests the same trend as Q. Its means across the three regions
are 0.103, 0.077, and 0.063 respectively. In the low HHI region, the investment
rate is 0.01, 0.025, 0.058, 0.118, and 0.224 at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th
percentiles respectively. In the intermediate HHI region, the investment rate is 0.008,
0.020, 0.043, 0.089, and 0.168 at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles
respectively. Lastly, the investment rate is 0.009, 0.019, 0.038, 0.072, and 0.128 at
the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles respectively in the high HHI region.
Total assets, expressed as its natural log, has the same trend as Q and invest-
ment rate. The means in the three regions are 5.561, 5.198, and 5.081 respectively.
At different percentiles, this item is higher in the lower HHI region than the inter-
mediate HHI region. Other than the 90th percentile, it is higher in the intermediate
HHI region than the high HHI region at the other 4 percentiles.
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The variable volatility, defined as the standard deviation of the previous 12
monthly stock returns, suggests that industries in the lower HHI region are more
risky than industries in the other two regions, as its mean is 0.147, which is a bit
larger than 0.140 and 0.137, the means in the other regions. The volatility in the
lower HHI region at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th percentiles is 0.0548, 0.082,
0.123, 0.184, and 0.262 respectively. The distributions of the volatility in the other
two regions are very similar: for the intermediate HHI region, the volatility is 0.054,
0.081, 0.120, 0.173, and 0.244 at those 5 percentiles respectively; for the higher HHI
region, the volatility is 0.052, 0.077, 0.115, 0.169, and 0.240 at those 5 percentiles
respectively.
Cash flows, defined as its ratio to total assets, do not have a clear trend. While
the mean −0.025 in the low HHI region is the smallest, compared to −0.013 in the
intermediate HHI region and 0.008 in the high HHI region, the distribution of cash
flows tells us a different story: the cash flow ratio is 0.078, 0.133, and 0.183 at the
50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles respectively in the low HHI region, which is higher
than in the two other regions. The cash flow ratio is 0.071, 0.121 and 0.174 at the
50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles in the intermediate HHI region, and 0.073, 0.119,
and 0.167 in the high HHI region.
The last variable, cash holdings scaled by total assets, has a similar trend as
Q. Its mean is 0.219, 0.205, 0.172 in the three regions respectively. Cash holdings
in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles are largest in the low HHI region,
which is counter-intuitive, given their higher debt level. In the low HHI region,
holdings are 0.011, 0.037, 0.122, 0.335, and 0.603, compared to 0.008, 0.028, 0.107,
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0.308, and 0.578, and 0.008, 0.026, 0.093, 0.245, and 0.469 in the intermediate HHI
region and the high HHI region respectively.
2.3.2 Main Results
In this section, we study our two hypotheses regarding the impact of convert-
ible debt on investment.




where Ii,j,t is the investment rate, and αt and δj are time and industry effects,
respectively, and Xi,j,t−1 includes a number of control variables, some of which are
borrowed from previous work on investment (e.g., Akdogu and Mackay (2008, 2012),
Dessaint et al (2018)). We estimate this specification for the pooled sample and for
subsamples defined by HHI region. The regression results are reported in Tables
2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. In Table 2.2, the low HHI region, the intermediate HHI region and
the high HHI region are HHI<0.09, 0.1<HHI<0.18, and HHI>0.4 respectively. To
further study the robustness of these results, we change the cutoffs in Table 2.3 and
2.4. In Table 2.3, we have three regions: HHI<0.08, 0.11<HHI<0.17, and HHI>0.5.
In Table 2.4, we have three regions: HHI<0.075, 0.12<HHI<0.16, and HHI>0.6.
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Small HHI Intermediate HHI Large HHI
Mean 90th Std Mean 90th Std Mean 90th Std
Convertible Sharet−1 0.080 0.277 0.233 0.082 0.318 0.232 0.063 0.181 0.212
Total Leveraget−1 0.245 0.542 0.753 0.230 0.512 0.333 0.225 0.500 0.258
Qt−1 2.426 4.333 6.473 2.274 4.117 3.145 2.096 3.624 4.880
Investment Ratet 0.103 0.224 0.424 0.077 0.168 0.159 0.063 0.128 0.149
Firm Sizet−1 5.561 8.756 2.335 5.198 7.995 2.156 5.081 8.142 2.259
σt−1 0.147 0.262 0.106 0.140 0.244 0.103 0.137 0.240 0.103
Cash Flowt−1 −0.025 0.183 2.053 −0.013 0.174 0.529 0.008 0.167 0.374
Cash Holdingst−1 0.219 0.603 0.236 0.205 0.578 0.234 0.172 0.469 0.200
Notes: This table reports summary accounting statistics for 107,664 observations from the period 1985 to 2005 obtained
from Compustat and CRSP. There are 25,210, 29,188 and 53,266 observations in the low HHI region (i.e., HHI<0.1),
the intermediate HHI region (0.1<HHI<0.18), and the large HHI region (HHI>0.18), respectively.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Firms Reporting Convertible Debt (1985–2005)
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Full Low HHI Intermediate HHI High HHI
Qi,j,t−1 0.004
∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(2.02) (8.20) (6.31) (1.98)
Convertible Sharei,j,t−1 −0.004 0.031
∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.013
(−1.20) (1.74) (−5.87) (−0.88)
Convertible Share2i,j,t−1 −0.000 −0.030 0.071
∗∗∗ 0.019
(−0.20) (−1.63) (5.98) (1.09)
Total Leveragei,j,t−1 0.001 −0.026
∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.011∗
(0.10) (−5.1) (−2.19) (−1.66)
σi,j,t−1 −0.029
∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.027∗∗
(−3.28) (−6.41) (−0.05) (−2.30)
Cash Flowi,j,t−1 0.010 0.010
∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.010
(1.46) (3.94) (2.94) (1.58)
Cash Holdingsi,j,t−1 0.011
∗ −0.012∗ 0.001 0.019∗∗
(1.92) (−1.79) (0.13) (2.27)
Firm Sizei,j,t−1 −0.004
∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(−6.08) (−6.75) (−3.72) (−6.60)
Peers Ij,t 0.089
∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ −0.203∗∗∗
(2.20) (4.72) (4.13) (−3.57)
R2 0.121 0.197 0.129 0.189
#Obs 107,664 21,961 29,188 13,770
Notes: This table reports our main results: the estimated coefficients of independent variables across
four samples: full sample, low HHI region (HHI<0.09), intermediate HHI region (0.1<HHI<0.18), and
large HHI region (HHI>0.4). t statistics are in parentheses. Firm i’s peers’ variables are computed by
averaging across firms in the same four-digit industry excluding firm i. Most of peers’ variables including
convertible share, convertible share square, Q, total leverage, σj,t, cash holdings, cash flows, and size
are not reported in this table. Asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 significance levels.
Table 2.2: Linear Regression Results across Different HHI Regions
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R2 0.211 0.145 0.199
#Obs 17,884 22,123 7,960
Notes: This table reports the regression results of independent variables across
three smaller samples: low HHI region (HHI<0.08), intermediate HHI region
(0.11<HHI<0.17), and large HHI region (HHI>0.50). Values in parentheses are t statis-
tics. Most of peers’ variables including convertible share, convertible share square, Q,
total leverage, σj,t, cash holdings, cash flows, and size are not reported in this table.
Asterisks ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 significance levels.
Table 2.3: Linear Regression Results across Different Smaller HHI Regions
As shown in the first column of Table 2.2, which reports pooled results for the
full sample, while Q, σ, cash holdings, size, and peers’ investment rate all have a
significant effect on investment, the effect of debt composition (convertible share in
the table) is not significant. However, this result is misleading. When we divide
our observations into three regions by the degree of competition, debt composition
has a positive and significant effect on investment in the first region (low HHI)
while overall debt has a negative and significant effect on investment. In the second
region (intermediate HHI), debt composition has a negative and significant effect on
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R2 0.217 0.147 0.212
#Obs 16,451 16,026 4,704
Notes: This table reports the regression results of independent variables across
three smaller samples: low HHI region (HHI<0.075), intermediate HHI region
(0.12<HHI<0.16), and large HHI region (HHI>0.60). Values in parentheses are t statis-
tics. Most of peers’ variables including convertible share, convertible share square, Q,
total leverage, σj,t, cash holdings, cash flows, and size are not reported in this table.
Asterisks ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 significance levels.
Table 2.4: Linear Regression Results across Different Smaller HHI Regions
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R2 0.276 0.205 0.296
#Obs 10,336 16,975 8, 541
Notes: This table reports the regression results of independent variables across three re-
gions for firms with low-level leverage (smaller than 0.231): low HHI region (HHI<0.08),
intermediate HHI region (0.1<HHI<0.18), and large HHI region (HHI>0.40). Values in
parentheses are t statistics. Most of peers’ variables including convertible share, con-
vertible share square, Q, total leverage, σj,t, cash holdings, cash flows, and size are not
reported in this table. Asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 significance
levels.
Table 2.5: Linear Regression Results across Different HHI Regions for Firms with
Lower Leverage
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R2 0.183 0.105 0.222
#Obs 9,616 12,213 5,229
Notes: This table reports the regression results of independent variables across three re-
gions for firms with high-level leverage (greater than 0.231): low HHI region (HHI<0.09),
intermediate HHI region (0.1<HHI<0.18), and large HHI region (HHI>0.40). Values in
parentheses are t statistics. Most of peers’ variables including convertible share, con-
vertible share square, Q, total leverage, σj,t, cash holdings, cash flows, and size are not
reported in this table. Asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 significance
levels.
Table 2.6: Linear Regression Results across Different HHI Regions for Firms with
Greater Leverage
Low HHI Intermediate HHI High HHI
Qi,j,t−1 < 1.163 0.065
∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ 0.040
(2.95) (−3.47) (1.49)
1.163 < Qi,j,t−1 < 2.073 0.060
∗∗ −0.030∗∗ −0.021
(2.35) (−2.10) (−1.37)
Qi,j,t−1 > 2.073 0.000 −0.081
∗∗ −0.084
(0.01) (−2.16) (−1.56)
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients of convertible share across three regions for
firms with different Q (1.163 and 2.073 are 30th percentile and 70th percentile respectively):
low HHI region (HHI<0.09), intermediate HHI region (0.1<HHI<0.18), and large HHI region
(HHI>0.40). Values in parentheses are t statistics. Asterisks ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.10 significance levels.
Table 2.7: Linear Regression Results across Different HHI Regions for Firms with
Different Q
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investment. The effect is not linear but quadratic, for the coefficient of the quadratic
term is positive and significant. Overall debt has a negative and significant effect
on investment. In the third region (high HHI), the significance of debt composition
disappears. Only overall debt has a negative and significant effect. The effect of debt
composition is robust even as we narrow the three regions (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4),
further supporting hypothesis 1 and 2. In addition, both the first order effect and
the quadratic effects becomes more significant as we narrow the regions. A common
result in the three tables is that peers’ investment has a positive and significant effect
on a firm’s own investment rate in competitive industries, suggesting that firms in
the first region face very significant external competitive pressure. Another common
result shown in these tables, which is consistent with the finding of Akdogu and
Mackay (2008), is that the investment-Q sensitivity is highest in oligopoly industries
industries and lowest in monopolistic industries.
In our study, there is a gap between region 2 (0.1<HHI<0.18), where the
effect of convertible debt is negative, and region 3 (0.4<HHI), where the effect of
convertible debt is insignificant. We divide this gap to form a number of subregions
using a width of 0.01. We find that the effect of convertible debt is insignificant for
a number of subregions, negative and significant for a small number of subregions,
and positive and significant for several subregions. Since this gap 0.18<HHI<0.4 is
on the boundary of region 2 and region 3, these results are still consistent with our
findings. However, for the sake of precision, we don’t include this gap in our main
regions.
We expect that the facilitation role of convertible debt, which is due to interest
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payment and leverage reduction (as argued by Mayers (1998)) and has a positive
effect on investment, is more significant for firms with greater leverage and less
significant for firms with lower leverage. To study this role, the whole sample is
divided into two parts using the mean (0.231) debt ratio of all observations. For
low leverage firms, neither the positive effect of convertible debt or the negative
quadratic term is significant in the first region (HHI<0.09). These results are not
reported in Table 2.5. As a comparison, both effects are significant in the first region
(HHI<0.09) for high leverage firms, as shown in Table 2.6. When we decrease the
cutoff point from 0.09 to 0.08, as shown in Table 5, the positive effect of convertible
debt and the negative effect of the quadratic term are significant again even for
low leverage firms. Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 report similar results (convertible debt
has a positive, negative, and insignificant effect on investment in very competitive
industries, oligopoly industries, and monopolistic industries respectively), consistent
with our hypothesis and suggesting that our interaction effect is robust for firms with
different leverage.
We expect that the dilution role, which has a negative effect on investment, is
more significant for firms with high Q and less significant for firms with low Q. To
study this role, we divide our sample into three parts using the 30th percentile and
70th percentile of the distribution of Q. Results are reported in Table 2.7. In the
first region (HHI<0.09), the estimated coefficient of convertible debt is only signifi-
cant in the first two subregions. When Q is very large (Q>2.073), the positive effect
of convertible debt is no longer significant, even if we narrow the first region. In the
second region (0.1<HHI<0.18), all estimated coefficients are negative and signifi-
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cant. In the third region (HHI>0.4), all estimated coefficients are not significant,
suggesting that our interaction effect is robust for firms with different levels of Q.
2.3.3 Further Discussion
2.3.3.1 Call Protection
The empirical results presented in this paper suggest that convertible debt
has a positive effect, a negative effect, and insignificant effect on investment rates,
depending on the degree of competition, supporting our intuition that the facili-
tation role outweighs the dilution role in competitive industries while the dilution
role outweighs or just cancels the facilitation role out in oligopolies and monopolies,
respectively. If firms do not expect that they will call convertible debt, then firms
will offer hard call protection, since such bonds will be expensive. If firms do ex-
pect that they will call convertible debt, then firms will offer weak call protection.
Consequently, such bonds will be cheap. We expect that firms with low Q in very
competitive industries will offer weak call protection whereas firms in less compet-
itive industries will offer hard call protection. Korkeamaki and Moore (2004b) find
that the number of years following issuance needed for firms’ cumulative capital
expenditure to exceed the proceeds has a positive correlation with call protection.
The greater the number of years, the harder the call protection. As shown in Table
2.1, the investment rate is the highest in the first region, which may or may not
indicate that the call protection offered by firms in the first region will be weak. We
leave this question to a future study.
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2.3.3.2 Existing Hypotheses
We argue that existing hypotheses cannot explain our empirical finding.
Eisdorfer (2008) and Dorion et al(2014) provide evidence arguing that finan-
cially distressed firms have a strong risk shifting incentive. Specifically, Eisdorfer
(2008) argues that there is a positive relation between volatility and investment for
financially distressed firms. Both find evidence that convertible debt curbs the risk
shifting incentive. Using their results, and assuming that investment investment
(capital expenditure scaled by total assets) represents risk shifting, convertible debt
should have a negative and significant effect on investment for financially distressed
firms. We, however, find that convertible debt has a positive and significant effect
on investment for financially distressed firms in the first region, as shown in Table
6.
Our hypothesis is similar to Mayers’ (1998) sequential investment hypothesis.
We extend his work (facilitation role) by considering two opposing roles (facilitation
role versus dilution role). If we use Q as a proxy for investment opportunities,
using Mayers’ results, we should expect that convertible debt has a positive effect
on investment for firms with high Q and a negative effect on investment for firms
with low Q. However, as reported in Table 7 and depending on region, convertible
debt has either a negative and significant or an insignificant effect on investment for
firms with high Q. For firms with low Q in the first region, convertible debt has a
strong positive and significant effect on investment.
Putting aside Q for a moment, astute readers may still think the negative and
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significant effect on investment in the second region is due to convertible debt’s role
of curbing over-investment, which is benefical to existing shareholders. However,
many researchers including Spence (1977), Dixit (1980) and Akdogu and Mackay
(2012) argue that over-investment is optimal for existing shareholders when there is
competition because firms want to induce exit or deter entry. If over-investment is
optimal for existing shareholders, then the negative and significant effect might be
due to dilution effect.6
2.4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the interaction effect of convertible debt and industry
competitiveness on investment. Using data from 1985 to 2005 provided by Com-
pustat, we find interesting results: In very competitive industries, the effect of
convertible debt on investment is positive, while in less competitive industries, the
effect is negative. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that when firms
face serious survival pressure, convertible debt serves as a convenient instrument
for funding investment and deleveraging due to its conversion property Conversely,
when firms face less survival pressure, the agency issue brought by conversion is
more significant, which deters firms from investing.
These results have implications on announcement effects and long term effects
of convertible debt issuance. If all investments are value enhancing and the ratio of
convertible debt to total debt is small, then we expect that the announcement effect
6There might be 2 channels: One is conversion ex post decreasing the investment incentive ex
ante. Another is that firms not willing to call convertible debt, which is still due to the dilution
effect, have to pay interest and hence have less fund to invest.
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Dates #Obs Cusips Managers Regression Coeff Constant R2
31dec1990 147,257 3006 1023 −0.646 6.12 0.3466
30sep1991 155,684 2842 1030 −0.657 6.25 0.3395
31dec1991 165,651 3116 1096 −0.646 6.227 0.3370
31mar1992 170,139 2989 1116 −0.677 6.439 0.3265
30jun1992 172,380 3104 1115 −0.665 6.36 0.3470
30sep1992 175,990 3369 1115 −0.657 6.24 0.3367
31dec1992 186,957 3658 1161 −0.670 6.35 0.3143
31mar1993 191,584 3589 1172 −0.669 6.342 0.3348
30jun1993 196,174 3619 1179 −0.662 6.273 0.3231
30sep1993 202,137 3850 1166 −0.659 6.252 0.3294
31dec1993 209,003 4089 1195 −0.681 6.455 0.3074
31mar1994 214,615 4119 1219 −0.684 6.499 0.3373
30jun1994 213,943 4176 1211 −0.690 6.584 0.3469
30sep1994 215,246 4158 1198 −0.690 6.522 0.3436
31mar1995 219,851 4210 1254 −0.684 6.425 0.3531
30jun1995 227,866 4354 1270 −0.667 6.276 0.3416
30sep1996 254,570 4769 1370 −0.677 6.441 0.3443
31dec1996 265,661 4995 1418 −0.673 6.452 0.3391
31mar1997 270,638 4969 1443 −0.664 6.347 0.3667
30jun1997 276,805 4944 1453 −0.665 6.372 0.3442
30sep1997 286,751 5035 1464 −0.677 6.550 0.3471
31dec1997 297,908 5122 1571 −0.682 6.644 0.3577
31mar1998 307,638 5059 1607 −0.680 6.551 0.3566
30jun1998 322,784 5077 1624 −0.644 5.969 0.2875
30sep1998 316,873 4890 1617 −0.628 5.894 0.3075
31dec1998 328,788 5096 1719 −0.615 5.646 0.2822






= C − α ln(W̄ oj,t) + ǫi,j,t.
This table reports estimated results from December 1990 to December 1998. The variable #Obs
reports the number of matched observations. The variable Cusips reports the number of unique
Cusips on that day. The variable Managers report the number of unique asset managers who
report their holdings on that day.
Table A.1: Log Linear Regression Results (dec1990–dec1998)
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Dates #Obs Cusips Managers Regression Coeff Constant R2
31mar1999 336,802 4949 1740 −0.605 5.412 0.2981
30jun1999 347,591 4811 1761 −0.587 5.175 0.2750
30sep1999 333,066 4741 1752 −0.598 5.356 0.2928
31dec1999 349,104 4857 1852 −0.570 4.973 0.2597
31mar2000 360,530 4805 1880 −0.562 4.928 0.2805
30jun2000 355,080 4599 1807 −0.548 4.640 0.2495
31dec2001 385,437 4261 1994 −0.604 5.111 0.2621
30sep2002 380,207 4016 2038 −0.610 5.210 0.2878
31dec2002 384,153 4013 2087 −0.636 5.44 0.2821
31mar2003 389,777 3805 2086 −0.614 5.189 0.2974
30jun2003 398,680 3820 2066 −0.636 5.398 0.2679
30sep2003 403,351 3822 2046 −0.645 5.528 0.2676
31dec2003 431,684 3841 2168 −0.657 5.648 0.2533
31mar2004 441,741 3803 2201 −0.662 5.782 0.2617
30jun2004 444,838 3792 2199 −0.651 5.54 0.2299
30sep2004 441,265 3781 2179 −0.665 5.736 0.2625
31dec2004 467,875 3807 2353 −0.666 5.695 0.2405
31mar2005 470,133 3793 2393 −0.651 5.474 0.2447
30jun2005 470,887 3804 2403 −0.660 5.567 0.2297
30sep2005 470,903 3773 2388 −0.664 5.665 0.2519
31mar2006 488,914 3806 2561 −0.670 5.671 0.2383
30jun2006 486,100 3770 2567 −0.661 5.673 0.2306
31dec2007 511,157 3765 3013 −0.683 5.915 0.2492
31mar2008 507,656 3689 3036 −0.654 5.549 0.2686
30jun2008 516,097 3682 3056 −0.657 5.444 0.2703
30sep2008 491,881 3663 2999 −0.637 5.436 0.2917
Notes: This table reports estimated results from March 1996 to September 2008.
Table A.2: Log Linear Regression Results (mar1999–sep2008)
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Dates #Obs Cusips Managers Regression Coeff Constant R2
31dec2008 481,563 3639 3044 −0.632 5.242 0.2562
31mar2009 474,334 3505 3050 −0.662 5.629 0.3073
30jun2009 484,877 3424 3019 −0.668 5.485 0.2626
30sep2009 479,404 3400 2913 −0.689 5.798 0.2903
31dec2009 486,458 3416 2983 −0.698 5.846 0.276
31mar2010 493,145 3361 2985 −0.701 5.828 0.281
30jun2010 485,812 3343 2963 −0.674 5.673 0.2713
30sep2010 487,249 3328 2830 −0.696 5.879 0.2761
31dec2010 503,968 3321 3033 −0.7 5.751 0.2568
31mar2011 516,811 3303 3059 −0.694 5.873 0.2769
30jun2011 512,935 3252 3059 −0.685 5.716 0.2551
30sep2011 496,243 3238 3023 −0.696 6.039 0.286
31dec2012 535,110 3262 3318 −0.692 5.66 0.263
30sep2013 568,495 3296 3273 −0.669 5.411 0.2435
31dec2013 609,084 3343 3584 −0.698 5.767 0.234
31mar2014 628,518 3366 3617 −0.691 5.649 0.224
30jun2014 637,103 3442 3639 −0.67 5.232 0.2004
30sep2014 635,876 3483 3574 −0.653 4.999 0.2144
31dec2014 633,556 3520 3587 −0.656 5.19 0.2177
31mar2015 631,984 3526 3573 −0.649 5.036 0.2183
30jun2015 636,554 3550 3542 −0.651 4.955 0.1926
30sep2015 628,097 3612 3473 −0.644 4.981 0.2189
31dec2015 624,049 3647 3438 −0.647 5.049 0.2146
Notes: This table reports estimated results from December 2008 to December 2015.
Table A.3: Log Linear Regression Results (dec2008–dec2015)
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1st 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
31mar2004 −0.595 −0.625 −0.712 −0.695 −0.680 −0.623
(0.0118) (0.0033) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0024)
31mar2005 −0.485 −0.593 −0.717 −0.687 −0.669 −0.616
(0.0102) (0.0037) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0022)
31mar2006 −0.529 −0.624 −0.741 −0.703 −0.679 −0.628
(0.0090) (0.0038) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0023)
31mar2008 −0.536 −0.538 −0.703 −0.705 −0.686 −0.632
(0.0071) (0.0038) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0022)
31mar2009 −0.571 −0.556 −0.698 −0.705 −0.690 −0.652
(0.0072) (0.0037) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0021)
31mar2010 −0.667 −0.598 −0.768 −0.744 −0.701 −0.659
(0.0082) (0.0036) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0024)
31mar2011 −0.629 −0.618 −0.765 −0.724 −0.692 −0.659
(0.0072) (0.0041) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0024)
31mar2014 −0.546 −0.615 −0.777 −0.732 −0.686 −0.641
(0.0076) (0.0045) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0025)
31mar2015 −0.545 −0.516 −0.697 −0.698 −0.676 −0.632
(0.0070) (0.0040) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0023)
Notes: This table reports quantitle regression results from march 2004 to march 2015. We
report estimated coefficients and White-corrected standard errors in the first and second line
respectively for each quarter.
Table A.4: Quantile Regression for the First Quarter of Years (2004–2015)
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Dates Cusips 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
30jun1998 5077 6.227 7.071 7.640 8.067 8.407
30sep1998 4890 6.351 7.144 7.753 8.203 8.566
31dec1998 5096 6.037 6.934 7.628 8.098 8.466
31mar1999 4949 6.079 6.909 7.527 7.991 8.366
30jun1999 4811 6.126 6.932 7.548 8.016 8.404
30sep1999 4741 6.118 6.936 7.562 8.019 8.417
31dec1999 4857 6.029 6.927 7.585 8.109 8.531
31mar2000 4805 6.071 7.027 7.716 8.224 8.637
30jun2000 4599 6.118 7.011 7.638 8.133 8.577
31dec2001 4261 5.719 6.886 7.497 7.918 8.267
30sep2002 4016 5.966 6.956 7.541 7.921 8.253
31dec2002 4013 6.020 6.933 7.438 7.817 8.164
31mar2003 3805 6.152 6.943 7.443 7.817 8.166
30jun2003 3820 6.182 6.943 7.409 7.770 8.085
30sep2003 3822 6.322 7.002 7.450 7.783 8.097
31dec2003 3841 6.369 7.038 7.485 7.797 8.093
31mar2004 3803 6.403 7.073 7.519 7.841 8.125
30jun2004 3792 6.342 7.010 7.430 7.777 8.069
30sep2004 3781 6.425 7.072 7.488 7.812 8.106
31dec2004 3807 6.331 7.010 7.444 7.775 8.071
31mar2005 3793 6.356 7.009 7.424 7.741 8.060
30jun2005 3804 6.392 7.004 7.418 7.751 8.041
30sep2005 3733 6.419 7.068 7.487 7.816 8.108
31mar2006 3806 6.473 7.083 7.463 7.796 8.099
30jun2006 3770 6.585 7.181 7.583 7.906 8.196
31dec2007 3765 6.669 7.301 7.702 8.027 8.334






+ 2/3 ln W̄jt.
By dropping redundant value for each stock, the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile of
this value are reported for each quarter ranging from June 1998 to December 2007
Table A.5: Weak Version Study (jun1998–dec2007)
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Dates Cusips 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
31mar2008 3689 6.755 7.318 7.707 8.047 8.340
30jun2008 3682 6.558 7.120 7.541 7.895 8.207
30sep2008 3663 6.750 7.396 7.808 8.147 8.453
31dec2008 3639 6.443 7.196 7.679 8.025 8.338
31mar2009 3505 6.549 7.228 7.658 7.980 8.261
30jun2009 3424 6.398 6.995 7.391 7.730 8.003
30sep2009 3400 6.450 7.001 7.421 7.756 8.035
31dec2009 3416 6.384 6.990 7.388 7.708 7.993
31mar2010 3361 6.358 6.959 7.371 7.671 7.949
30jun2010 3343 6.368 7.028 7.499 7.832 8.108
30sep2010 3328 6.464 7.057 7.496 7.815 8.082
31dec2010 3321 6.366 6.940 7.367 7.683 7.956
31mar2011 3303 6.476 7.090 7.529 7.860 8.149
30jun2011 3252 6.496 7.049 7.496 7.836 8.109
30sep2011 3238 6.657 7.233 7.674 8.014 8.273
31dec2012 3262 6.384 6.982 7.410 7.758 8.036
30sep2013 3296 6.361 6.995 7.425 7.784 8.116
31dec2013 3343 6.384 7.048 7.485 7.830 8.135
31mar2014 3366 6.406 7.070 7.502 7.840 8.151
30jun2014 3442 6.302 6.926 7.362 7.711 8.013
30sep2014 3483 6.308 6.900 7.355 7.701 8.064
31dec2014 3520 6.398 7.084 7.539 7.898 8.227
31mar2015 3526 6.359 6.998 7.462 7.817 8.172
30jun2015 3550 6.210 6.888 7.375 7.741 8.066
30sep2015 3612 6.341 7.024 7.469 7.873 8.227
31dec2015 3647 6.272 7.028 7.500 7.882 8.235
Notes: This table reports estimated results from December 2008 to December 2015.
Table A.6: Weak Version Study (mar2008–dec2015)
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